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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
The state appeals from the district court’s order granting Pool’s motion to suppress,
arguing that the district court erred when it engrafted an exigency requirement onto the implied
consent exception to the warrant requirement.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
On January 12, 2016, Officer Hancuff received a report of a suspected impaired driver
heading west on Fairview near Mitchell. (9/18/2017 Tr., p.5, L.19 – p.6, L.7.) Responding to
the broadcast, the officer arrived at the scene of a vehicular crash that had just occurred.
(9/18/2017 Tr., p.6, Ls.7-11.) The officer identified one of the vehicles as the same vehicle
described in the report. (9/18/2017 Tr., p.6, Ls.12-18.) Pool was the driver of the vehicle and
his son was the passenger. (9/18/2017 Tr., p.6, L.19 – p.7, L.22.) Both were injured, and they
were transported to St. Alphonsus Hospital for medical treatment. (R., pp.15, 105.)
Though careful not to impede or interfere with Pool’s medical care, Officer Hancuff also
came to the hospital to question Pool and continue his investigation. (9/18/2017 Tr., p.9, L.21 –
p.11, L.24.) Anticipating the potential need to draw blood, the officer brought a blood draw kit
with him. (9/18/2017 Tr., p.12, L.22 – p.13, L.7.) A phlebotomist, who was gathering blood
samples for medical purposes, saw the officer’s kit and, knowing what it was, “asked if he
should take [the officer’s] samples as well.” (9/18/2017 Tr., p.13, Ls.8-22.) The officer said,
“Yes, of course.” (9/18/2017 Tr., p.13, L.13.) After the blood draw, but before any toxicology
examination of the blood, the officer read Pool his Administrative License Suspension advisory.
(9/18/2017 Tr., p.14, Ls.18-23.)
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In the immediate aftermath of the vehicular crash, Pool’s son had complained that he did
not believe that Pool’s doctors had told him not to drive while taking his medications.
(9/18/2017 Tr., p.8, L.25 – p.9, L.9.) Various medications were found in Pool’s car (9/18/2017
Tr., p.23, Ls.13-20), and, at the hospital, Pool told care-providers that he had taken prescription
medications including Chloradiazepoxide, Quetiapine, and Gabapentin (5/30/2017 Tr., p.46,
L.24 – p.47, L.11). These are, at least for the most part, intoxicating substances. (5/30/2017 Tr.,
p.49, L.19 – p.57, L.16.) The toxicology report from the blood draw later confirmed the
presence of prescription medications and metabolites for Chloradiazepoxide, Nordiazepam, and
Phenobarbital. (5/30/2017 Tr., p.46, Ls.18-22.) Pool also admitted possibly drinking a beer
earlier (9/18/2017 Tr., p.24, Ls.5-12) and, while at the hospital, he was given an HGN test which
he failed (9/18/2017 Tr., p.22, Ls.19-23; R., pp.15, 105).
The state charged Pool with felony injury to a child, felony driving under the influence,
and driving without privileges, with an enhancement for being a persistent violator of the law.
(R., pp.62-63, 99-100.) Pool filed a motion to suppress the toxicology evidence, asserting that
the warrantless blood draw violated his constitutional rights. (R., pp.102-06). The district court
held a hearing on the suppression motion (see
-- 9/18/2017 Tr.) and, following that hearing, granted
Pool’s suppression motion (R., pp.138-45). The state filed a notice of appeal timely from the
order granting suppression. (R., pp.151-53.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it granted Pool’s suppression motion?

3

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Granted Pool’s Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
Below, Pool sought to suppress evidence acquired through a warrantless blood draw. (R.,

pp.102-06.) The state argued that the warrantless blood draw was supported by Pool’s implied
consent. (R., pp.123-25.) The district court disagreed, holding that implied consent was not
present in this case because “there [was] no exigency at all and … a warrant could have readily
been obtained for a blood draw.” (R., pp.140-44.) But exigency is a wholly separate exception
to the warrant requirement, not an additional requirement to show implied consent. Application
of the correct legal standards shows that the district court erred when it granted Pool’s
suppression motion. The district court’s decision should be reversed and this case remanded.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a

motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court’s findings of fact that
are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of constitutional
principles to those facts. State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 843, 103 P.3d 454, 456 (2004).

C.

Because Pool Never Withdrew His Implied Consent, The Warrantless Blood Draw Was
Validated By Pool’s Consent
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that “[t]he right of the

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Requiring a person to submit to a
blood draw for evidentiary testing is a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
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Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).

Warrantless searches are generally

considered unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, “subject only to a few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions.” Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372 (1993)
(internal citations and quotations omitted). One exception to the warrant requirement is a search
done pursuant to consent. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (citations
omitted); State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796, 69 P.3d 1052, 1057 (2003).

Freely and

voluntarily given consent validates a search. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 222 (citations omitted).
The voluntariness of an individual’s consent is a question of fact to be determined based upon
the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 227.
Consent may be implied under Idaho Code § 18-8002 where an officer has reasonable
grounds to believe a person is operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or other
drugs. The reasonable grounds to believe that Pool was operating his vehicle while under the
influence in this case are myriad: Officer Hancuff, responding to a report of a suspected
impaired driver, arrived at the scene of a vehicular accident caused by the reported vehicle
(9/18/2017 Tr., p.5, L.19 – p.6, L.18; see also R., pp.138-39); bottles of prescription drugs were
found in Pool’s car (9/18/2017 Tr., p.23, Ls.13-20; see also R., p.139) and Pool’s son, a
passenger in that vehicle, admitted that Pool had taken medications but complained that he
believed that doctors had not informed Pool not to drive (9/18/2017 Tr., p.8, L.25 – p.9, L.9; see
also R., p.139); at the hospital, Pool admitted taking prescription drugs (5/30/2017 Tr., p.46,
L.24 – p.47, L.11; see also R., p.139); he also admitted that he might have drunk a beer earlier
(9/18/2017 Tr., p.24, Ls.5-12; see also R., p.139); and Pool failed an HGN test, administered by
the officer at the hospital (9/18/2017 Tr., p.22, Ls.19-23; R., pp.15, 105). There were reasonable
grounds to believe that Pool had been driving while under the influence of drugs and/or alcohol,
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and implied consent for evidentiary testing under Idaho Code § 18-8002 was therefore at issue in
this case.
The Idaho Supreme Court has explained that, for statutorily implied consent under Idaho
Code § 18-8002 to be voluntary, two circumstances must be present: “(1) drivers give their initial
consent voluntarily and (2) drivers must continue to give voluntary consent.” State v. Wulff, 157
Idaho 416, 423, 337 P.3d 575, 582 (2014). “Drivers in Idaho give their initial consent to
evidentiary testing by driving on Idaho roads voluntarily.” Id. (citing State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho
300, 303, 160 P.3d 739, 742 (2007)).

That Pool voluntarily drove on Idaho roads was

uncontested at his suppression hearing. Therefore, his initial implied consent for evidentiary
testing was voluntary and valid.
The question remains whether Pool’s consent continued to be valid. The Idaho Supreme
Court has recognized that statutorily implied consent can be withdrawn. See State v. Arrotta,
157 Idaho 773, 774, 339 P.3d 1177, 1178 (2014); State v. Halseth, 157 Idaho 643, 646, 339 P.3d
368, 371 (2014). “[A] defendant’s refusal, protest, or objection to alcohol concentration testing
terminates the implied consent given under Idaho’s implied consent statute.” State v. Eversole,
160 Idaho 239, 242, 371 P.3d 293, 296 (2016). Also, “implied consent may be withdrawn where
a suspect refuses to consent.” State v. Rios, 160 Idaho 262, 266, 371 P.3d 316, 320 (2016).
However, a suspect does not need to affirmatively give consent for a blood draw to be valid
under his statutorily implied consent; rather, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that “statutorily
provided implied consent is valid and remains in place until affirmatively withdrawn.” State v.
Charlson, 160 Idaho 610, 618, 377 P.3d 1073, 1081 (2016) (emphasis added); see also State v.
Ortega-Vastida, 161 Idaho 864, 866, 392 P.3d 42, 44 (Ct. App. 2017).
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There is no evidence that suggests, let alone demonstrates, that Pool ever revoked or
withdrew his implied consent. Pool never expressed any indication that he did not want to
cooperate with evidentiary testing. (9/18/2017 Tr., p.13, L.23 – p.14, L.2.) He never said that he
would refuse to submit to a breath test or a blood draw. (9/18/2017 Tr., p.14, Ls.3-5.) As the
phlebotomist began taking Pool’s blood, he did not resist, pull away, or fight in any way; rather,
he was generally cooperative. (9/18/2017 Tr., p.14, Ls.6-17.) Even after being presented with
the administrative license suspension warning, Pool still did not express any hesitation or
reservation about submitting to evidentiary testing. (9/18/2017 Tr., p.16, Ls.1-12.) Because
Pool never affirmatively withdrew his implied consent, it remained valid through the blood draw.
The district court, however, did not apply these correct legal standards when addressing
the central issue in this case. While noting that the Idaho Supreme Court in Charlson “held that
the Idaho implied consent statute permitted the blood draw because the suspect had not
withdrawn his consent and had driven voluntarily” (R., p.143), and recognizing that a key factor
in the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013),
was the defendant’s refusal to take a breath test (R., p.142), the district court failed to consider
either Pool’s voluntary driving or his lack of objection (whether through word or action) to the
blood draw. Instead, it focused on whether there was an exigency and, finding none, held that
“when a warrant can be readily obtained and there is no exigency, a warrant must be obtained.”
(R., p.144.) But the state never argued that exigency provided an exception to the warrant
requirement in this case (see, e.g., 9/18/2017 Tr., p.27, Ls.4-5); it argued that the blood draw was
valid due to Pool’s statutorily implied consent (see 9/18/2017 Tr., p.27, L.6 – p.31, L.7)—and
those are two separate exceptions.
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Statutorily implied consent is a valid exception to the warrant requirement. Statutorily
implied consent applies to this case, as the state argued below, because there were reasonable
grounds to suspect that Pool had driven his vehicle while under the influence. It was uncontested
that Pool voluntarily drove on Idaho roadways and so voluntarily gave his initial implied consent
to evidentiary testing. Pool never affirmatively withdrew that implied consent. (See 9/18/2017
Tr., p.13, L.23 – p.16, L.12.) Pool’s warrantless blood draw was valid pursuant to the statutorily
implied consent exception to the warrant requirement. The district court erred when it ignored
this valid exception to the warrant requirement. The district court’s order, suppressing the results
of Pool’s blood draw, should be reversed and this case remanded.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court’s order granting
Pool’s suppression motion and remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 23rd day of May, 2018.

/s/ Russell J. Spencer
RUSSELL J. SPENCER
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 23rd day of May, 2018, served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT by emailing an electronic copy to:
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

/s/ Russell J. Spencer
RUSSELL J. SPENCER
Deputy Attorney General
RJS/dd
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